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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the ‘strategic action field’ (Fligstein and McAdam 2013) evolving in five 
European countries (and the U.S.) around the inclusion of Muslims into military chaplaincy. The paper 
shows that cross-national institutional differences in particular with regard to the state-religion 
relationship have an influence on the accommodation of Muslims in military chaplaincy: countries 
with a strong focus on equality in their state-religion relationship are more advanced in setting up a 
Muslim military chaplaincy, whereas countries whose state-religion relationship explicitly allows for 
the differential treatment of religious groups lag behind, in particular if Muslims are among the groups 
for whom official cooperation with the state is impossible since they have not acquired the requested 
legal status. At the same time, the paper shows that organization-specific arguments that push for 
religious accommodation and equal treatment in the military lead to a convergence of practices across 
the different European countries. Similar things are ‘at stake’ in the strategic action field that evolves 
around the inclusion of Muslims into military chaplaincy: the distribution of scarce chaplaincy 
positions, training and education of chaplains, security and control of religion, attracting new recruits 
and assuring social cohesion as well as being in line with principles of equality and religious liberty. 
France stands out in this comparison because it reached a high level of Muslim accommodation in 
military chaplaincy that stands in stark contrast with the limited accommodation of religion reached in 
public schools. All European countries in the study differ fundamentally from the U.S. where the 
distribution of chaplaincy positions is organized along a relatively easy market-based system that does 
not depend on the European institutionalization of faith-specific military chaplaincies. 
Keywords 
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In Europe, the integration of large immigrant groups of Muslim faith has challenged host-country 
institutions (Rath, Groenendijk et al. 1991, Laurence 2012, Bowen, Bertossi et al. 2014, Burchardt and 
Michalowski 2015). Some public institutions, in particular schools, have been in the center of 
conceptual and ideological debates about how to re-negotiate the secular and the religious in the light 
of religious pluralization. In these public debates, the military has received relatively little attention 
which might have been different at times when the military was still perceived as a central force 
behind the reproduction of the nation state. Today, most European countries
1
 have abolished or 
suspended conscription which is seen as a reason why the military has lost importance as a public 
institution that contributes to nation-building. In this process of becoming all-volunteer forces the 
military also had to redefine its bonds with society. While during times of conscription it was 
relatively easy to claim that the military was “representative of society” (though it never was given 
that women were not drafted and that alternative civilian service has long existed in liberal 
democracies) all-volunteer forces today feel pressurized to prove this representativeness. 
Restructuration creates many challenges for the armed forces in Europe that range from finding new 
recruits willing to engage in military operations abroad to maintaining social cohesion despite 
pluralization, not along the historically important lines of social class and regional belonging
2
, but 
along categories such as gender, sexual orientation, ethnic background and religion that are of 
increasing importance for all public institutions in 21
st
 century liberal democracies. From this 
perspective the military is a very typical public institution, yet one whose strategies towards the arrival 
of Muslims as a mostly new immigrant religious minority have received little attention in public and 
scientific debates. Studying the integration of Islam in the military also helps to avoid bias in scholarly 
and political reflection on challenges for public institutions that might arise from research and political 
debates too narrowly focused on always the same public institutions and accrediting a large 
importance to schools.  
It is the aim of the present contribution to fill this void by focusing on the real, planned and/or 
discussed emergence of a Muslim military chaplaincy. Military chaplaincy is the central structure in 
the armed forces of most Western democracies when it comes to organizing and practicing religion. 
The creation of a new chaplaincy usually goes along with a detailed definition of religious rights for 
soldiers of that particular denomination and the military chaplains become internal ‘lobbyists’ for their 
religion. As such they not only provide religious and more general spiritual support to soldiers but 
they can also advise commanding officers in cases concerning their religion. Thus, military chaplains 
also take on the role of religious experts in the armed forces and they act as representatives for their 
religion in daily but also in highly official situations. Therefore having an own military chaplaincy 
means much more than ‘just’ having a spiritual leader for common prayer.  
Three things should be noted, however, right away: first, the absence of a Muslim military 
chaplaincy does not imply the absence of any chaplaincy support for Muslims. In European countries 
that dispose of a Jewish military chaplaincy, Jewish chaplains have taken on the role of lobbyists for 
Muslims for example on issues of dietary requests. Jewish and Christian chaplains have also provided 
spiritual care to Muslim soldiers if they wished so. This spiritual care that is open to any soldier is not 
focused on religion but on personal or ethical problems that an individual soldier might face. From this 
perspective, which is certainly one of the most important chaplaincy tasks deontological- as well as 
time-wise, the provision of military chaplaincy services can be understood as a low-threshold 
counseling service. Second, even in countries where Muslims do dispose of an own military 
chaplaincy, other religious minorities are still excluded. Thus the question for which groups military 
chaplaincy should be opened is a permanent dilemma, at least under the European model where 
chaplaincy positions are never distributed uncoupled from a denomination-specific chaplaincy whose 
                                                     
1
 Exceptions are Austria, Switzerland as well as some Scandinavian and Baltic states.  
2
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introduction requires important organizational change. Third, military chaplaincies cannot be created 
without the strong support of the minister and ministry of Defense but their absence is not the pure 
result of official refusal either. Many religious communities show no or little interest in having an own 
military chaplaincy. Muslim communities in Europe are currently striving for accommodation in many 
public institutions including the military but the military is not of prior concern.  
This paper will provide some elements of analysis for what is at stake in collective strategic action 
evolving around the arrival of a new group in the field of military chaplaincy. It assumes that this 
collective strategic action does not take place in an empty space but that it is embedded in a specific 
national political opportunity structure shaped in particular by a country’s relationship between state 
and religion. Even though actors in the strategic field are free and rational, the set of plausible and 
legitimate policy solutions is limited by this national political opportunity structure. Against this 
background, one can ask what influences cross-national institutional differences in terms of state-
religion regimes have on the strategic action field evolving around the inclusion of Muslims into 
military chaplaincy? 
Theorizing Collective Strategic Action and Cross-National Differences 
Many authors have developed ideas about collective action based on rational choice theory and thus 
focusing on the competition over and the distribution of scarce resources (for many see: Crozier and 
Friedberg 1977, Schelling 1980, Friedberg 1993). They focus on the strategies that individual and 
collective actors employ to secure their access to particular resources and that are marked by 
cooperation and refusal to cooperate, general power relations and attempts to dominate the framing of 
a given situation. Most recently, Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam (2013) have published a book that 
summarizes ideas they developed on this topic over the past twenty years. Their unit of analysis is 
what they call the “strategic action field” which can roughly be described as a set of actors who know, 
monitor and react to each other with regard to the distribution of certain resources. Some social actors 
are more skilled than others in analyzing the field and “work to improve their position in an existing 
strategic action field or define their privilege” (Fligstein and McAdam 2013: 7). In opposition to an 
“unorganized social space”, a strategic action field is well-defined in the sense that it is relatively clear 
which collective actors do or do not operate in the field (Fligstein and McAdam 2013: 5). However, 
fields are also “constructed on a situational basis, as shifting collections of actors come to define new 
issues and concerns as salient” (Fligstein and McAdam 2013: 10). This implies that new action fields 
can emerge and others disappear.  
As “mesolevel social orders” (Fligstein and McAdam 2013: 3) strategic action fields can be 
relatively stable but stability is not natural. It is rather the result of “actors working very hard to 
reproduce their local social order”. From this perspective, power relations are not set in stone but 
actors constantly have to make little adjustments in order to secure their dominant position. Thus some 
incremental change happens all the time, even under relatively stable social conditions (Fligstein and 
McAdam 2013: 12). When organizational change happens, it is preceded by a change in dominant 
ideas. In fact, the members of a strategic action field share a certain set of understandings, which can 
be regrouped into four different categories: first, what is going on in the field or what is at stake, 
second, who are the actors in the field, how do they relate to each other and what power positions does 
each actor occupy, third, what are the “rules” in the field, i.e. what strategies are possible, legitimate, 
and interpretable for each of the roles in the field. Finally, there is the broad interpretive frame that 
individual and collective strategic actors bring to make sense of what others within the strategic action 
field are doing (Fligstein and McAdam 2013: 10-11). By underlining that these shared understandings 
depend on the members of the field, Fligstein and McAdam point to the constructed nature of these 
understandings and oppose the otherwise often-used notion of “institutional logics” (Scott and Davis 
2007) since it suggests a unity of interpretations that may simply not exist (Fligstein and McAdam 
2013: 10-11). 
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The actors in the field can be described as incumbents, challengers and governmental units. 
Incumbents have a large influence in a field and see their interests and views “heavily reflected in the 
dominant organization of the strategic action field” (Fligstein and McAdam 2013: 10-11). Challengers 
occupy “less privileged niches within the field and ordinarily wield little influence over its operation. 
While they recognize the nature of the field and the dominant logic of incumbent actors, they can 
usually articulate an alternative vision of the field and their position in it” (Fligstein and McAdam 
2013: 10-11). Governance units are “charged with overseeing compliance with field rules and, in 
general, facilitating the overall smooth functioning and reproduction of the system. (…) It is important 
to note that virtually all such governance units bear the imprint of the influence of the most powerful 
incumbents in the field and the ideas that are used to justify their dominance” (Fligstein and McAdam 
2013: 13). 
All strategic action fields are embedded in a broader field, the environment. There are distant and 
proximate fields, fields that show dependence, interdependence or independence from each other as 
well as state and nonstate fields. Exogenous shocks coming from this larger environment can lead to 
mobilization within a given strategic action field. In some cases, a true episode of contention can 
occur, followed by a new or refurbished institutional settlement (Fligstein and McAdam 2013: 18-20).  
The strategic action field studied in this paper is constituted around the question which religious 
groups may provide chaplains to the armed forces. Only a small number of actors operates in this 
field. Most prominent are the incumbents who are the powerful established military chaplaincies and 
their respective sending churches as well as the ministry of defense that is usually represented by a 
specific unit in charge of religious issues and military chaplaincy. The challengers are the weak 
established military chaplaincies as well as religious groups outside the military that wish to send 
military chaplains to the armed forces. In addition, there are military academies that deliver 
background knowledge on issues such as military chaplaincy, specific faith groups (e.g. Muslims), or 
the attitudes and the behavior of soldiers within the armed forces. They sometimes act as think tanks 
on the question how to introduce a new military chaplaincy. Some countries also dispose of specific 
units within the armed forces that are in charge of implementing diversity measures. For reasons of 
space, the present paper only looks at one central aspect of the strategic action field analysis proposed 
by Fligstein and McAdam (2013), namely at the question “what is going on in the field or what is at 
stake”. A detailed analysis of the other aspects (the actors and their power position, the “rules” of the 
field, and the broad interpretive frame actors bring to understand the field) will be provided elsewhere.  
Country Differences 
Yet, before studying in more detail what is at stake, focus will shift to a second theoretic approach that 
is dominant in migration research on the religious accommodation of Muslims, namely cross-national 
ideological differences with regard to state-religion relationship. In migration research it has often 
been argued, that state-religion relationship is decisive for the form of religious accommodation of 
Muslim immigrants and Islam encountered in each national context (for many see: Fetzer and Soper 
2005). In Fligstein and McAdam’s theory (2013) these ideologies would most likely be reflected in the 
set of understandings that are shared by all actors regarding the rules in the field, i.e. what strategies 
are possible, legitimate and interpretable. The question then of course would be whether these national 
ideologies defining how the state-religion relationship should be organized prevail over the local 
social order as produced in the specific institutional context of the military? 
The countries chosen for this study show cross-national institutional differences in terms of state-
religion relationship: Three of the six countries under study follow an ideology of equal treatment for 
all religious groups. In the case of the Netherlands and the US this equal treatment principle translates 
into equal support by the state for religious groups that are allowed to manifest themselves in the 
public sphere. Jonathan Fox (2008) calls this accommodation. In the case of French laïcité the 
principle of equal treatment translates into equal restrictions on the expression and practice of faith in 
the public sphere for all groups. This is why Jonathan Fox (2008) classifies France as separationist. 
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The three other cases selected for this study follow an ideology of state-religion relationship that 
allows for the differential treatment of religious groups. Austria, Belgium and Germany all implement 
so-called models of cooperation between state and religion (Fox 2008: 108-109) where selected 
religious groups closely cooperate with the state on selected topics such as military chaplaincy. In the 
cases of Belgium and Austria, however, Islam is recognized as an official partner for the state since 
1912 and 1974 respectively (Mattes and Rosenberger 2015, Torrekens 2015). In Germany, this official 
recognition of a Muslim body as a corporation under public law is still pending. Thus in both types of 
regimes, namely those focused on equal treatment and those officially allowing for differential 
treatment different sub-types of regimes have been chosen to allow for further contrasting and theory-
building. Not part of this case selection are models of state-religion relationship that Jonathan Fox 
(2008: 108-109) calls “one official religion” (e.g. Norway as well as until recently Denmark and 
Sweden), “multiple official religions” (e.g. Finland, UK) and “civil religion” (Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain). 
State of the Art 
The literature on the accommodation of religious pluralism in the field of military chaplaincy is very 
scarce. There is a growing but still small body of literature that focuses on strategies pursued by public 
institutions other than the military regarding religious pluralism (Khosrokhavar 2004, Beckford, Joly 
et al. 2005, Thériault 2009, Becci 2011, Gauthier 2011, Stoeckl and Roy forthcoming 2015). Many of 
these studies focus on prisons and they find that prisons are often willing to accommodate religion 
since religion is deemed to be functional for the re-socialization of prisoners. In the case of Muslim 
inmates, the control of religion has however become a major concern and prison authorities have 
developed different strategies how to check for undesired forms of religious fundamentalism (Stoeckl 
and Roy forthcoming 2015).  
Some studies, all them ordered or supported by the respective armed forces, have studied the 
situation of individual Muslim soldiers in the military (Baumgarten and Gober 2002, Bosman 2008, 
Settoul 2008, Menke and Tomforde 2010, Menke and Langer 2011, Krainz 2012, Sandhoff 2013). 
These studies usually point to persisting forms of discrimination, deliver individual accounts of 
integration into the military and identify structural hurdles. Particularly interesting in this regard is the 
study by Bertossi and Wihtol de Wenden (2007) on the situation of French Muslim soldiers because it 
was initially commissioned by the French Armed Forces and then served as a catalyst for the 
introduction of a Muslim military chaplaincy. Ron E. Hassner’s edited volume (2014) takes a slightly 
different approach by analyzing how in armed forces worldwide religion and the dominance of certain 
groups affect “military operations and the conduct of war” (Hassner 2014: 10), without, however, 
paying special attention to the accommodation of religious minorities. Two additional edited volumes 
largely focus on policies that govern ethnic and religious diversity in the military (Soeters and van der 
Meulen 2007, Kümmel 2012) but they do not provide a systematic comparative analysis of religious 
accommodation.  
Military academies and the military chaplaincies themselves have produced publications on 
military chaplaincy and the relationship between the state and the church in general as well as on 
specific aspects of this cooperation such as the role of chaplains in peace processes (Dörfler-Dierken 
2008) or in international operations (Barker and Werkner 2008). In the 1990s Martin Bock has 
produced an international comparison of military chaplaincy that is largely descriptive and focuses on 
structural components of military chaplaincy such as the financing and the management within the 
military structure (Bock 1992, 1994, 1998). In addition, there are a few single-case studies on military 
chaplaincy such as a comparison by Inger Furseth’s (2003) on the role of Muslim religion in the 
military and prisons in Norway and by Andrew Todd on the role of Muslim chaplaincy in prisons and 
the military in the United Kingdom (Todd 2015). Finally, closest to this study probably are the study 
on chaplains and religious diversity in the US military by Kim Hansen (2012) and the extended 
analysis by Christophe Bertossi on the case of the French military (Bertossi 2014). While Bertossi 
looks at the institutional reframing of republican integration by the French military, Hansen explicitly 
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studies how military chaplains deal with religious diversity and how different understandings of what 
the role of chaplains in the U.S. military should be are negotiated. Both studies, however, focus on one 
single country. Thus, as it seems there is no systematic cross-national comparison including more than 
two cases of how the military accommodates religious diversity and as far as I can tell also no other 
cross-national comparison of another public institution including more than two cases. This is an 
important gap in the existing literature because theories of cross-national differences in 
accommodation (for many see: Fetzer and Soper 2005) largely ignore the idea of institution-specific 
opportunity structures for religious accommodation. The recently published edited volume by John 
Bowen et al. (2014) is an important exception. This book focuses on the idea of organizational 
differences and specificities in Muslims’ religious accommodation but it loses out of sight (or rather 
outright rejects) the idea that cross-national differences most importantly in state-religion relationship 
influence the way in which national public institutions accommodate religion (Bowen, Bertossi et al. 
2014: 9-12). It is the aspiration of the present research to combine theories on cross-national 
differences with theories from the sociology of organizations.  
Methods of Data Collection and Analysis 
The findings result from a qualitative comparative research based on semi-structured interviews with 
religious experts in the armed forces of different Western European countries and the United States. 
The structure of the interview is roughly as follows: 1) How is your chaplaincy organized? 2) How is 
religion accommodated in your armed forces? 3) Were there any conflicts about religious 
accommodation or the setup of a new chaplaincy? 4) How does the situation in your armed forces 
compare to the situation in other countries and in other institutions within your country? My sample of 
interviewees is not representative of either a particular religious group, of the entire chaplains’ corps 
or the armed forces under study. I interviewed experts who in many cases are chiefs of chaplains. 
They have an exposed position within their organization and are particularly knowledgeable regarding 
the question of religion in the military. Since this knowledge is only published to a very small extent, 
the interviews allow me to identify organizational logics and strategies in response to religious 
diversity as well as arguments supporting these strategies. I pay special attention to the influence of 
the respective national environment on these strategies. The study is idiographic because it “seeks to 
fully describe a single artifact or case from a phenomenological perspective and to connect the unique 
aspects of the case with more general truths or principles” (Neuendorf 2002: 11). It relies on 46 formal 
interviews in German, French and Dutch language (based on full transcripts of written records taken 
during the interviews), 10 informal discussions (documented only via short notes on recollections from 
memory after the discussion) and written records on the participation in three conferences that 
gathered scientists and practitioners (i.e. military chaplains). In addition, I did extensive internet 
research mainly on military or military chaplaincy related websites, on government and parliament 
websites and in the media. I also consulted the publications that were produced by the different 
military chaplaincies and given to me during interviews. All interview reports and internet sources 
providing information not mentioned by the interviews were coded with a theoretically-derived and 
empirically confirmed coding scheme (Mayring 2008, Gläser and Laudel 2009) using Atlas.ti. This 
coding scheme brought to the fore the five different issues of ‘what is at stake’ in military chaplaincy 
when Muslims join the ranks presented below.  
Findings on the Organization of Military Chaplaincy 
The existence of military chaplaincy is not a natural given but a religious accommodation that many 
secular states worldwide provide (Hassner 2014). This accommodation is contested by pacifists who 
are either inspired by (Christian) religious principles of non-violence, thereby condemning all forms of 
institutional cooperation between the military and the church, or by political leftist ideologies directed 
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against the military and oftentimes against religion.
3
 Particularly claims in favor of a total separation 
of the church and the military that are voiced from within the Christian churches show that the 
established churches have come to an arrangement with worldly principles that may contradict some 
of the core religious principles such as non-violence.
4
 In the interviews, military chaplains usually 
underlined that they do not bear arms, that they have one foot in the military but also one foot outside 
and that their motivation is not to win a war and sustain the military power of their country but to 
provide spiritual assistance to individuals who unarguably face dire conditions and are thus in need of 
help. By pointing this out, chaplains present themselves as having no stake in the military core 
business and in power structures that support it. For the protestant church in Germany, Ines-Jacqueline 
Werkner however noticed that state-financed chaplaincy positions and social influence in a public 
institution motivated the protestant church of East Germany to accept the introduction of a military 
chaplaincy even though its congregation opposed the adoption of the West German model of military 
chaplaincy after reunification (Werkner 2004: 30-31).  
In Europe, the United States of America and other countries with Christian majorities, chaplaincies 
were first granted to Christians. Then, in particular during times of war and colonial empire, Jewish 
and Muslim chaplains were allowed or invited to join the military (Hank, Simon et al. 2013, Heidborn 
2014). After World War II Western European countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany 
and the Netherlands fell back on all-Christian military chaplaincies. The following section presents 
how these all-Christian chaplaincies opened up to other faith groups, describing pair-wise the current 
situation in the different countries and then contrasting these findings for Europe against the situation 
in the United States. 
A Chaplaincy for Jews, a Chaplaincy for Muslims: France and the Netherlands 
France and the Netherlands are two countries that similarly defend the idea of equal treatment of all 
religious groups, but these two countries formally diverge with regard to ideas about how this equal 
treatment should be achieved. Whereas the Netherlands provide equal support for all groups (classified 
by Jonathan Fox 2008 as accommodation), France equally rejects support for all groups (classified by 
Jonathan Fox 2008 as separationist). When it comes to military chaplaincy, however, France and the 
Netherlands both turn out to be particularly accommodative to religion, though in a slightly different 
sense. Among all of Europe’s armed forces the Netherlands are the country with the highest number of 
non-Christian religious groups established as full military chaplaincies.
5
 In fact, next to the Catholic 
and the Protestant chaplaincies, there is a Humanist, a Jewish, a Muslim and a Hindu chaplaincy in the 
Netherlands. Yet, most of the 151 chaplain positions are distributed among what is called in the Dutch 
military the three “big services”: the Catholic chaplaincy holds 55 positions, the Protestant chaplaincy 
52 and the Humanist chaplaincy 38 positions. The so-called “small services” only dispose of two 
chaplains each, i.e. there are two Jewish, two Muslim and two Hindu chaplains to the Dutch armed 
forces.  
France also holds a special position in Europe. Even though the total number of religious groups 
represented in military chaplaincy is smaller than in the Netherlands – namely four of which two are 
Christian – France has attributed the highest share in terms of total chaplaincy positions available to 
Muslims as an (immigrant) religious minority. Of the 228 full-time chaplaincy positions, 139 are 
granted to the Catholic military chaplaincy, 34 to the Protestant, 17 to the Jewish, and 38 to the 
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 See e.g., http://globnetabolishmilitarychaplaincy.webnode.com as well as http://www.ibka.org/artikel/militaer.html 
4
 For example the Confessio Augustana from 1530 that is still considered a fundament of the Lutheran Church in its article 
16 not only explicitly allows Christians to become soldiers but also condemns those contesting this.  
5
 The UK accommodates more groups, yet these are - except for the Jewish chaplaincy - all Christian groups namely: 
Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian, Baptist, Elim or Assemblies of God. The four so-called “world faith 
chaplains” (Sikh, Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist) are civilians, not full military chaplains. 
What is at stake in military chaplaincy when Muslims join the ranks? An international comparison 
7 
Muslim military chaplaincy, i.e. Muslim chaplains make up for almost 17% of all chaplains to the 
French armed forces.  
France and the Netherlands are also two of the only four European countries that dispose of a 
Jewish Military Chaplaincy (the two others are Hungary and the United Kingdom). In France, this 
chaplaincy has existed since the 19
th
 century and was re-established quickly after World War II. In the 
Netherlands, a Jewish Chaplaincy had existed in British exile (Prinses Irene Brigade) during World 
War II and was fully established within the Dutch Armed Forces in 1967. In the interviews, both the 
Dutch and the French Jewish Chief of Chaplains stated that they assisted Muslim soldiers for example 
with dietary requests before the arrival of the Muslim chaplaincy and that they supported the arrival of 
a Muslim military chaplaincy.
6
 This suggests that Jewish military chaplaincies have acted as internal 
lobbyists for Muslims (on this notion see: Dobbin, Kim et al. 2011).  
For the Netherlands it should be noted that despite the pre-existence of a Jewish and a Hindu 
(created in 2003) military chaplaincy the staffing decision concerning the Muslim military chaplaincy 
was difficult. After an initial decision to create such a chaplaincy had been taken in 2007, the two 
Muslim representative bodies in the Netherlands spent several years discussing who should have the 
authority to endorse military chaplains (Hilali 2007). After the CMO (Contactorgaan Moslims en 
Overheid) had proven to be a more reliable partner even in simple communication with the Ministry of 
Defense, the government one-sidedly opted for the CMO as a partner for further negotiations (Hilali 
2007). However, after this was set and after the Ministry of Defense had opted for two candidates as 
Muslim chaplains to the Dutch Armed Forces the minister of Defense had to justify his choice of a 
candidate deemed too orthodox in his religion and not loyal enough in his attachment to the 
Netherlands by some conservative right parties. In France, apparently no comparable discussions took 
place. On the one hand, the ministerial directive from 2005 on the organization of military chaplaincy 
lowered the required level of education for military chaplains from what used to be “bac +5” (i.e. high 
school diploma plus 5 years of university education) to a simple high school diploma. On the other 
hand, all candidates for Muslim military chaplaincy were obliged to participate in a laïcité training 
provided by the Institut Catholique, a catholic institute of higher education that was initially the only 
university to have accepted this teaching assignment wanted by the French government. 
A Muslim Chaplaincy Planned but not Enacted: Belgium and Austria  
Belgium and Austria face a similar situation: in both countries, cooperation between the state and 
selected religious communities allows for differential treatment of religious groups. Also in both 
countries Islam acquired the position of a corporation under public law which entails public 
recognition as a partner for cooperation with the state in different fields, including military chaplaincy. 
As a consequence, the armed forces of both countries have planned to set up a Muslim military 
chaplaincy. The Austrian military budget entails two Muslim chaplaincy positions since 2008 (also cf. 
Krainz in this issue). In Belgium, one full Muslim chaplaincy position is waiting to be staffed. Thus, 
even though Islam has been recognized in Belgium for almost 40 years and in Austria for over 100 
years, the staffing of these chaplaincy positions turns out to be difficult. In addition, at least in the 
Austrian case, it seems that an initial attempt was made by the Ministry of Defense in 2008 to staff 
these two positions. Interviewees from the Austrian ministry of Defense and the different existing 
military chaplaincies mentioned that the representative body for Islam in Austria (IGGIÖ) under its 
previous board
7
 presented two “unsuitable” candidates that had to be rejected by the Ministry of 
Defense. Other interviewees also pointed out that the Ministry of Defense was not particularly 
                                                     
6
 At a conference in Paris in October 2012, also a Jewish chaplain from the British Armed Forces voiced concern over the 
differential treatment that Muslims and other so-called “world faith groups” received in the British Armed Forces due to 
their status as civilians.  
7
 Elections were held in 2011. 
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interested in having a Muslim military chaplaincy. One reason might be that the initial concentration 
of all self-declared orthodox (strenggläubig) Muslim recruits of to the Austrian military in the Maria-
Theresien barrack in Vienna was waved stepwise in the years between 2005 and 2011. The reason for 
this was the introduction of a new and cheaper central cooking method (cook and chill) that allowed 
for the provision of multicomponent meals and thus meals without pork in barracks all over Austria. 
Previously, all self-declared orthodox Muslims were located in the Viennese Maria-Theresien barrack 
since this was the only location in Austria where pork-free meals were cooked. During the high times 
of Muslim concentration in the Vienna barrack, one civilian employee at that barrack took the 
initiative to create a Muslim prayer room on the barrack premises that could host up to sixty military 
and civilian employees for Friday prayers. Even an office was created for the first Muslim chaplain 
who was expected to arrive in 2008. The employee who initiated this prayer room collected individual 
donations and was in relatively close contact with the powerful Catholic military chaplaincy that 
donated the loudspeakers for the call to prayer. This civilian employee was unable to fill the position 
himself since he did not meet the educational requirements for chaplains in the Austrian military. After 
the concentration of orthodox Muslims in the Vienna barrack ended, the prayer room lost its 
importance, the civilian employee who had created it was relocated to another military site and the 
office for the first chaplain remained empty. Six years after the planned start of a Muslim chaplaincy, 
negotiations about how to staff the two positions are still ongoing. When the staffing of the positions 
failed in 2008, it was decided that more energy should be placed on the arrival of an orthodox military 
chaplain. And indeed, in 2012, an Orthodox chaplain started to work on a civilian contractual basis for 
the Austrian military, next to 22 catholic and 7 protestant chaplains.  
In Belgium the delayed arrival of a Muslim military chaplaincy fits into the overall picture of a 
relatively weak military chaplaincy. In contrast to other countries where military chaplaincies are well-
identifiable units in the military that dispose for example of their own websites, the military 
chaplaincy in Belgium is integrated into the service of well-being, thus working alongside social 
workers and psychologists. Since the arrival of the Humanist military chaplaincy in 1998, the 
Protestant military chaplaincy has lost its power and positions. From some 7 military chaplain 
positions, it is down to only one military chaplain position in 2014 while the Humanists hold 8 
military chaplain positions next to the Catholics with 14 positions. Initially, the Jewish faith 
community also disposed of one military chaplain positions but the rabbi in charge of it slowly started 
to provide this service part-time since it was very difficult to keep up an entire chaplaincy with only 
one chaplain. The Protestants, who in early 2013 still disposed of three chaplaincy positions are 
obliged to hand in two positions by 2015 and are afraid to face the same fate as the Jewish chaplaincy. 
Yet while the Jewish position is vacant, the Muslim chaplaincy disposes of a secretariat that is 
currently staffed part-time by a veteran. As in Austria, the Ministry of Defense argues that the Muslim 
Executive of Belgium (see Torrekens 2015) is not able to agree on a candidate deemed “suitable” by 
the Ministry of Defense. Thus, negotiations over staffing are slow.  
Multiple Obstacles on the Way to Accommodation: Germany  
Germany differs from the two previously mentioned cases in that Muslims have not yet acquired the 
status of a corporation under public law. This implies explicit differential treatment in a system not 
precluding it. As a consequence, it may not come as a surprise that in Germany military chaplaincy is 
reserved to the Catholic and the Protestant churches only. The Protestant military chaplaincy is 
slightly bigger, holding 90 positions compared to 75 Catholic positions. According to interviewees in 
both chaplaincies, this distribution was decided unanimously among the two military chaplaincies 
because the Protestant chaplaincy has traditionally been slightly bigger than the Catholic one and 
because the Catholic church is running short of priests, including potential candidates for military 
chaplaincy. One Muslim organization (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland) claims Muslim 
military chaplains but it is not recognized as the only official representative body and thus has no 
public mandate to take this issue further. It is noteworthy, though, that in March 2014, the German 
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Islam Conference (DIK) has opted for chaplaincy as one of the two central topics for its new round of 
negotiations. Since the DIK has proven to be an influential mechanism for the religious 
accommodation of Muslims, one can expect that the call for “visible progress in the spiritual care of 
soldiers of Muslim faith in the German military” will be met when negotiations start on this topic in 
2015. Also within the German military, different scenarios for creating a Muslim military chaplaincy 
have been developed. It thus seems that what Fligstein and McAdam call a stable, two-groups field in 
which the main actors are able to reproduce themselves and the field over a fairly long period of time 
(Fligstein and McAdam 2013: 9) has come to be effectively contested. Interestingly, though, the 
effectiveness of this contestation can only partially be attributed to mobilization. In fact, the Humanist 
Union of Germany (HVD) has been far more mobilized for getting its own military chaplaincy than 
the Central Council of Muslims German (ZMD). However, the Humanists have been less successful 
than the Muslims so far. This suggests that other actors supported a Muslim but not a Humanist 
military chaplaincy in Germany. From what the interviews reveal, these actors seem to be located in 
the larger environment of the established Christian military chaplaincies that maintain close links with 
the military academy and the Center for Leadership Development and Civic Education (Zentrum 
Innere Führung) that is part of the Ministry of Defense. 
Chaplains without a Chaplaincy: the United States 
To close the intra-European comparison, a brief look at the organization of military chaplaincy in the 
United States is helpful to understand one central commonality behind all European cases. In the 
United States Armed Forces military chaplains are hierarchically organized within the five service 
branches but not according to their faith group. This means, that no faith-specific military chaplaincy 
exists even though among the over 2000 chaplains in the U.S. military, there are also Catholic, Muslim 
and a myriad of different Protestant chaplains. A religious group that seeks to send chaplains to the 
U.S. military needs to dispose of an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax exempt status for churches and 
religious organizations in order to register with the Department of Defense as a so-called “endorsing 
agency”. When a chaplaincy position opens, a chaplaincy candidate from any of the currently close to 
200 registered “endorsing agencies” – among them two Muslim and eleven Catholic churches – can 
apply for this position. He or she needs the endorsement of the endorsing agency and has to meet the 
military requirements posed by the Department of Defense before starting a career in one of the five 
service branches. In the interviews, the European chaplains often rejected the US American model of 
military chaplaincy, expressing some disbelief about the validity of such a non-denominational 
organization, in particular since US chaplains are supposed to provide the framework necessary for the 
religious practice of any religious group. The flexibility of the US system of military chaplaincy is of 
great advantage for smaller groups since contrary to Europe no profound organizational change is 
needed for their integration. Other than in Europe, no existing chaplaincy positions have to be re-
distributed in order for a new military chaplaincy to be set up. Still, this does not imply either that 
religious minorities encounter no difficulties in the US.
8
 In fact, some of these difficulties arise from 
this more market-based system since fundamentalist Evangelical Christians have managed to become 
dominant in some parts of the U.S. military and its chaplaincy because of strong and effective group 
mobilization.
9
  
                                                     
8
 For the experience of a Muslim chaplain at Guantanamo Bay who was subject of intense investigation see Yee, J. (2005). 
For God and Country. Faith and Patriotism under Fire. New York, Public Affairs. For the experience of a Pentecostal 
military chaplain who converted to Wicca religion see www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/18/AR2007021801396.html. For a Humanist who wants to become a Navy chaplain see 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/17/nation/la-na-humanist-chaplain-20130818 
9
 See e.g., www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/10/AR2006121000883.html as well as 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Air_Force_Academy#Religious_atmosphere 
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In sum, this section has shown that in Europe, existing strategic action fields have been challenged 
by the increasing societal inclusion of Muslims. In France and the Netherlands, this has resulted in 
important organizational changes, namely the creation of a new Muslim military chaplaincy. In 
Austria and Belgium some change has taken place but since the Muslim chaplain positions have not 
been staffed and since in Belgium important restructuration of the entire military chaplaincy is taking 
place, the strategic action field is still in movement. In Germany, a hitherto stable action field that was 
dominated by only two incumbents is increasingly contested and on the verge of changing. This 
contestation and change that has already occurred in some cases gives a good insight into what is at 
stake in the strategic action field of military chaplaincy when Muslims join the ranks.  
Analysis: What is at stake? 
As previously mentioned the analysis will focus on only one aspect of Fligstein and McAdam’s 
Theory of Fields, namely on the question what is at stake in a particular strategic action field. Five 
points can be highlighted:  
Chaplaincy Positions – the Redistribution of Scarce Resources  
Depending on the size of the armed forces, the military chaplaincy of all faith groups confounded can 
comprise only some 20 military chaplain positions as in Belgium or over 200 positions as in France or 
even over 2000 positions as in the United States. Yet, in all cases, military chaplain positions are a 
scarce resource. In the United States, these chaplaincy positions are distributed through the above-
mentioned market based system while in the European countries studied here, the distribution of 
chaplaincy positions is pre-negotiated between the state and the religious groups that are officially 
allowed to partake in this negotiation. Each religious group officially recognized as a partner in 
providing military chaplains thus disposes of a fixed number of chaplaincy positions. These are not 
constantly re-negotiated but often remain in place for many years or even several decades in a row. 
Changes in the attribution of chaplaincy positions have occurred mainly through a restructuring of the 
armed forces (e.g. after the end of conscription) or through the arrival of new groups. Continuous 
adaption of the distribution of chaplaincy positions to the country’s or the armed forces’ religious 
demography or to the demand voiced by soldiers is not foreseen. None of the European armed forces 
under study collects official religious statistics on a regular basis and mismatches evidenced by 
punctual statistics are easily ignored. Under these circumstances, skilled negotiators are likely to 
obtain more chaplaincy positions. In some countries, the Muslim representatives have claimed a 
comparatively high number of chaplaincy positions before the chaplaincy was set up but their outsider 
claims were simply dismissed as unrealistic. 
Training and Education of Chaplains 
Individuals wishing to be employed as military chaplains have to meet certain criteria that are defined 
by their religious group and by the military. While the military sets certain age, security, fitness and 
general educational standards, the respective religious groups often have more precise requirements in 
terms of theological training or practical experience in the civilian world before joining the military. 
Even though precise requirements differ across the countries, the established Christian churches who 
are insiders to the military chaplaincy usually support the idea that several a master degree in higher 
education is necessary to become a chaplain and that newcomer religions should also fulfill this 
requirement to be able to speak with chaplains of other faith groups on an equal footing. These 
educational standards are thus part of what in particular the Christian and the Jewish incumbents 
defend. These high educational standards can be a hurdle for new and still small immigrant religious 
minorities not only in Europe but also in the United States since the first highly educated immigrants 
from those groups often seek more prestigious or better remunerated positions in the labor market (e.g. 
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in engineering or medicine) while religious studies for becoming a military chaplain are of little 
interest. Among the countries studied only France has decided to lower the educational requirements 
for military chaplains from university education to a simple high school diploma. This allowed for the 
broad recruitment of chaplains among a pool of soldiers who were already engaged in the French 
military and for whom no questions of alliance arose.  
Security and Control of Religion 
In the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria debates about who would be apt to fill the first chaplain 
position of a newly created Muslim military chaplaincy proved to be lengthy. Discussions about 
whether candidates adhere to the principles of democracy and whether they stand for a too orthodox 
interpretation of Islam show that in particular the Ministry of Defense is concerned about its ability to 
control religion and ostracize fundamentalists. This control, however, is not done through any 
theological debates but largely focuses on anecdotal evidence. For example, the Dutch candidate for 
becoming the Muslim military chaplain had previously criticized the Dutch Prime Minister, voiced 
criticism about the mission in Afghanistan and signaled understanding for Muslim men refusing to 
shake hands with women, which then caused criticism about his loyalty to the Netherlands and his 
interpretation of Islam. The actual capacity of such anecdotal evidence to distinguish “good from bad” 
chaplains is questionable and in the case of the Dutch Muslim military chaplain, the Minister of 
Defense succeeded in convincing the Dutch Parliament of the candidate’s ability to act as a military 
chaplain. It should also be noted that Muslims are not the only religious group that experiences 
control. Among the manifold Protestant churches some are excluded from participation in military 
chaplaincy. In Europe, this exclusion mainly stems from the established protestant churches that can 
decide who becomes a member of the state-recognized Protestant representative body. In Germany, 
for example, only the 20 Lutheran, Reformed and United Protestant churches that are part of the 
Protestant Church in Germany (EKD) can send chaplains to the military. As a consequence, 
evangelical churches are per se excluded from military chaplaincy in Germany. This is different in 
France and Belgium where evangelical churches have been admitted to military chaplaincy. In France, 
new churches can join the Protestant Federation of France that is the official representative body of 
Protestants in France but not all churches who wish to become a member are actually included. In 
addition, the non-religious Humanists have been kept out of the system of military chaplaincy in all 
European countries and the United States except for the Netherlands and Belgium. In sum, the control 
of who comes in is a concern shared by the established churches and by the Ministry of Defense 
because those who are inside have of course a bigger chance to change things. It should be mentioned 
that some groups such as Jehovah’s witnesses do not wish to send chaplains to the military in 
particular because they want to avoid this kind of government control.  
Attracting new recruits and assuring social cohesion 
Austria is one of the few European countries to still have conscription. The armed forces of all other 
countries in this study are all-volunteer forces and thus heavily rely on new recruitment. Women and 
ethnic minorities are important target groups (for many see: Apt 2009). From this perspective, the 
accommodation of Muslims can also be understood as a strategy to secure not only recruitment of 
ethnic minorities, many of which are Muslims, but also to retain those who have found their way into 
the armed forces (Reding, Bassford et al. 2012). Self-selection of course is an important mechanism at 
work and as a consequence, Muslims who serve in all-volunteer forces rarely are particularly 
observant. Nonetheless, even for so-called “cultural Muslims” the existence of a Muslim military 
chaplaincy that acts as an advocacy group for Muslims within the military is of great symbolic value 
since it not only assures that religious practice is possible but also speaks out against any 
discriminatory practice that might impact the life of Muslim service members.  
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Being in line with principles of equality and religious liberty 
Finally the organization of a Muslim military chaplaincy is also a matter of respecting principles that 
are cherished in all liberal democracies such as equality and religious liberty. From this perspective, 
setting up a Muslim military chaplaincy is a way for the military to show that as an organization it is in 
line with expectations about how 21
st
 century liberal democracies should act with regard to diversity. 
This is a particularly important strategic aspect for all-volunteer forces that often feel criticized for 
being too detached from society. Thus, by creating Muslim military chaplaincies, the armed forces in 
Europe not only speak to possible recruits of Muslim belief but also send out a strong political and 
symbolic message to the rest of society.  
National Differences vs. Organizational Commonalities 
The present contribution has shown that the organization of military chaplaincy and its opening for 
Muslims responds to two different logics: (1) nation-specific logics that can push the armed forces in 
Europe towards divergence (in cases where these logics differ) and (2) organization-specific logics 
that can push them towards a convergence of practices in the field of religious accommodation.  
(1) The comparison has identified a number of differences in the outcomes of religious 
accommodation across the selected European countries and the United States of America. These cross-
national differences in religious accommodation are in line with the cross-national differences in state-
religion relationship. The equality-oriented models of France and the Netherlands that are similar in 
goal but different in approach have both lead to the establishment of a military chaplaincy for 
Muslims. Austria, Belgium and Germany that allow for the differential treatment of religious groups, 
however, have not established a Muslim military chaplaincy. Two of these selective cooperation 
models (Austria and Belgium) have granted official recognition to Islam and, as a consequence, they 
are more advanced in establishing a Muslim chaplaincy than Germany where Islam is not yet 
recognized as an official partner for the state. On a broader scale, the organization of European 
military chaplaincy differs profoundly from the organization of American military chaplaincy where 
the distribution of chaplaincy positions is organized along a relatively simple market-based system 
that plays out favorably for Muslims and other religious minorities who wish to send chaplains to the 
armed forces. These differences in military chaplaincy organization also have an influence on “what is 
at stake” in the different strategic action fields. In Europe, the distribution of chaplaincy positions 
across denominations is of central importance whereas this is a non-issue in the United States. Within 
Europe, France stands out because it let go the requirement of university education for military 
chaplains, thereby assuring the recruitment of some 40 chaplains of Muslim faith, partially from a pool 
of soldiers already engaged in the French Armed Forces. Also, there were no public debates in France 
about whether individual candidates were “in line” with principles of democracy and laicism. 
Apparently the French armed forces were confident that they have at their disposal a sufficiently large 
pool of Muslims who fully endorse the principles of the French Republic. The Austrian strategic 
action field differs from the one of other countries because the persistence of conscription greatly 
reduces the need to attract new recruits. However there is also a pressure for religious accommodation 
namely because the state obliges conscripts to serve in the military. 
(2) Other than that, similar issues seem to be at stake in the strategic action fields constituted in the 
different European countries around the inclusion of Muslim military chaplains. The distribution of 
chaplaincy position, training and education of chaplains, security and control of religion, attracting 
new recruits and assuring social cohesion as well as being in line with principles of equality and 
religious liberty all are issues “at stake” in most of the countries. Also, with regard to outcomes in 
accommodation, striking cross-national similarities can be observed – even across countries that are 
marked by differences in state-religion relationship such as France and the Netherlands. As was 
explained before, both countries dispose of a state-religion relationship that is strongly committed to 
the idea of equality and equal treatment. Ways how to achieve equality, however, differ: while the 
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Dutch system grants equal support to all religious groups, the French system denies any preferential 
treatment by the state to any religious group. According to the French ideal, the state establishes 
equality among individuals regardless of group membership whereas according to the Dutch ideal of 
religious governance, the state establishes equality among different groups. These differences play out 
very clearly in many public institutions, most prominently in schools. The French Armed Forces seem 
to adopt a strategy of “laïcité positive”, closer in a sense to the religion-friendly accommodative but 
still neutral attitude of the US American state. How is this deviation from the national ideology of 
strict separation between state and church possible?  
I argue that institution-specific opportunity structures account for these cross-national 
commonalities. In particular the argument that a strict separation between the public and the private 
sphere – one basic principle of the French laïcité model – is impossible for soldiers, right along the 
lines of Goffman’s (1961) ideas on total institutions, provides strong support for making an exception 
in the military. This, however, assumes that military decision-makers have an interest in 
accommodating religion. At least three arguments may explain as to why this could be the case: first 
the practice of religion might help those who believe to cope with great uncertainty such as produced 
by fighting at war. Critics of military chaplaincy criticize that chaplains make soldiers “fit for war”. 
They argue that even though military chaplains in Western Europe stopped blessing weapons, their 
mere presence on sites of military operations contributes to the legitimization of military action and 
may help individual soldiers to make sense of their action. Closely linked to this argument is a second 
one, pointing to the fact that military chaplaincy has a long tradition in many European armed forces 
as well as in the U.S. From this perspective, the accommodation of Muslims allows to demonstrate 
that similar treatment is provided by the armed forces. This helps to strengthen the institution since it 
reaffirms a military core principle of equal treatment. Finally, the need of all-volunteer forces to 
identify new recruitment potentials also pushes armed forces in Europe towards the integration of 
Islam since accommodation is thought to send out a signal of openness and equal opportunities. This 
organization-specific interest in accommodating religion has contributed to the more or less advanced 
openings of military chaplaincies for Muslims. In all European countries under study, the former 
balance of powers has been effectively contested. Countries that do not yet dispose of a Muslim 
military chaplaincy either already planned the positions or discuss their introduction. In all cases 
studied here, Muslims are perceived to be a group with legitimate claims on military chaplaincy. And 
for reasons that are also intrinsic to the military institution, Muslims have made their way onto the 
agenda of Defense policy makers.  
These findings on religious accommodation in the military allow formulating the hypotheses that 
institution-specific opportunity structures for religious accommodation are shaped by national political 
opportunity structures such as the state-religion relationship. If, however, strong institution-specific 
pressures for a certain type of accommodation of religion exist and if the arguments formulated in 
favor of such accommodation can still appeal to at least some elements of the national ideology (for 
example the French armed forces still refer to equality as a principle), then institution-specific forms 
of religious accommodation can differ from nation-specific approaches to accommodation as they are 
implemented by other public institutions. These hypotheses need to be tested against a larger sample 
of cases for verification.  
  
Ines Michalowski 
14 
References 
Apt, W. (2009). Trends in Demographie und Gesellschaft: Auswirkungen auf Streitkräfte und 
militärische Rekrutierung. Streitkräfte unter Anpassungsdruck. G. Kümmel. Baden-Baden, Nomos: 
127-156. 
Barker, C. R. and I.-J. Werkner (2008). "Military Chaplaincy in International Operations: A 
Comparison of Two Different Traditions." Journal of Contemporary Religion 23: 47- 62. 
Baumgarten, V. A. and S. Gober (2002). Allah and Uncle Sam: Muslims in the US Armed Forces, The 
Department of the Air Force. 
Becci, I. (2011). "Religion's Multiple Locations in Prison. Germany, Italy, Switzerland." Archives de 
Sciences Sociales des Religions 153(1): 65-84. 
Beckford, J. A., D. Joly and F. Khosrokhavar (2005). Muslims in Prison: Challenge and Change in 
Britain and France. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan  
Bertossi, C. (2014). French "Muslim" Soldiers? Social Change and Pragmatism in a Military 
Institution. European States and Their Muslim Citizens. The Impact of Institutions on Perceptions 
and Boundaries. C. B. John R. Bowen, Jan Willem Duyvendak, Mona Lena Krook. New York, 
Cambridge: 73-103. 
Bertossi, C. and C. Wihtol de Wenden (2007). Les couleurs du drapeau. L'armée française face aux 
discriminations. Paris, Robert Laffont. 
Bock, M. (1992). Religion und Militär. Konzeptionelle Überlegungen zum internationalen Vergleich 
der Seelsorge an Soldaten. München, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr. 
Bock, M. (1994). Soldatenseelsorge in Österreich und Frankreich. München, Sozialwissenschaftliches 
Institut der Bundeswehr. 
Bock, M. (1998). Religion within the armed forces. Military Chaplaincy in an International 
Comparison. Strausberg, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr. 
Bosman, F. (2008). Uniformed Diversity. A multifaceted approach towards the diversity climate in the 
Netherlands defence organisation. . PhD (Proefschrift) Universiteit Tilburg. 
Bowen, J., C. Bertossi, J.-W. Duyvendak and M.-L. Krook, Eds. (2014). European States and Their 
Muslim Citizens. The Impact of Institutions on Perceptions and Boundaries. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Burchardt, M. and I. Michalowski, Eds. (2015). After Integration: Islam, Conviviality and Contentious 
Politics in Europe. Wiesbaden/New York, Springer VS. 
Crozier, M. and E. Friedberg (1977). L'acteur et le système. Paris, Editions du Seuil. 
Dobbin, F., S. Kim and A. Kalev (2011). "You can't always get what you need: organizational 
determinants of diversity programs." American Sociological Review 76(3): 386-411. 
Dörfler-Dierken, A., Strausberg. (2008). Zur Entstehung der Militärseelsorge und zur Aufgabe der 
Militärgeistlichen in der Bundeswehr. Forschungsberichte des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts 
der Bundeswehr. Strausberg, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr. 
Fetzer, J. S. and J. C. Soper (2005). Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Fligstein, N. and D. McAdam (2013). A Theory of Fields. New York, Oxford University Press. 
Fox, J. (2008). A World Survey of Religion and the State. New York, Cambridge University Press. 
Friedberg, E. (1993). Le pouvoir et la règle. Dynamiques de l'action organisée. Paris, Seuil. 
What is at stake in military chaplaincy when Muslims join the ranks? An international comparison 
15 
Furseth, I. (2003). "Securalization and the Role of Religion in State Institutions." Social Compass 
50(2): 191-202. 
Gauthier, J. (2011). "Des corps étrange(r)s dans la police ? Les policiers minoritaires à Paris et à 
Berlin." Sociologie du Travail 53(4): 460-477. 
Gläser, J. and G. Laudel (2009). Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse als Instrumente 
rekonstruierender Untersuchungen. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag. 
Goffman, E. (1961). On the Characteristics of Total Institutions. Asylums. Essays on the social 
situation of mental patients and other inmates. E. Goffman. New York, Anchor Book: 1-124. 
Hank, S., H. Simon and U. Hank (2013). Feldrabbiner in den deutschen Streitkräften des Ersten 
Weltkrieges. Berlin, Hentrich&Hentrich. 
Hansen, K. P. (2012). Military Chaplains and Religious Diversity. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hassner, R. E. (2014). Religion in the Military Worldwide. New York, Cambridge University Press. 
Heidborn, T. (2014). Muslimische Kriegsgefangene im Ersten Weltkrieg. Wie Wissenschaft und 
Propaganda im Wünsdorfer "Halbmondlager" funktionierten. kulturradio rbb. Berlin. 
Hilali, M. (2007). Voor volk en vaderland? Imams binnen de Nederlandse krijgsmacht. 
Khosrokhavar, F. (2004). L’Islam dans les Prisons. Paris, Balland. 
Krainz, U. (2012). Zur Problematik kultureller Integration. Junge muslimische Männer beim 
Österreichischen Bundesheer und Zivildienst. Marburg, Tectum Verlag. 
Kümmel, G., Ed. (2012). Die Truppe wird bunter: Streitkräfte und Minderheiten. Baden-Baden, 
Nomos. 
Laurence, J. (2012). The Emancipation of Europe's Muslims: The State's role in Minority Integration. 
Erwing, Princeton University Press. 
Mattes, A. and S. Rosenberger (2015). Islam and Muslims in Austria. After Integration. Islam, 
Conviviality and Contentious Politics in Europe. M. Burchardt and I. Michalowski. Wiesbaden / 
New York, Springer VS. 
Mayring, P. (2008). Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. Grundlagen und Techniken. Weinheim und Basel, 
Beltz Verlag. 
Menke, I. and P. C. Langer, Eds. (2011). Muslim Service Members in Non-Muslim Countries. 
Experiences of Difference in the Armed Forces in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. Forum 
International 29. Strausberg, Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences. 
Menke, I. and M. Tomforde (2010). Soldatinnen und Soldaten muslimischen Glaubens in der 
Bundeswehr. Strausberg, unpublished. 
Neuendorf, K. A. (2002). The content analysis guidebook. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications. 
Rath, J., K. Groenendijk and R. Penninx (1991). "The recognition and institutionalization of Islam in 
Belgium, Great Britain and the Netherlands." New Community 18: 101-114. 
Reding, A., M. Bassford, C. Celia, K. Weed and E. Hassan (2012). La gestion de la diversité ethnique 
dans les armées, Cahiers de l'IRSEM no. 17. 
Sandhoff, M. (2013). Service, Sacrifice, and Citizenship: The Experiences of Muslims Serving in the 
U.S. Military, University of Maryland  
Schelling, T. C. (1980). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
Ines Michalowski 
16 
Scott, W. R. and G. F. Davis (2007). Organizations and Organizing. Rational, Natural, and Open 
System Perspectives. Upper Saddle River, Pearson International Edition. 
Settoul, E. (2008). "Musulmans dans les armées, entre banalisation institutionnelle et altérité 
imaginaire." Migrations Société 120. 
Soeters, J. and J. van der Meulen, Eds. (2007). Cultural Diversity in the Armed Forces: an 
international comparison London / New York, Routledge. 
Stoeckl, K. and O. Roy, Eds. (forthcoming 2015). Religious pluralism in a Christian format: the 
"Muslim chaplain" in European prisons. Special Issue of the International Journal for Society, 
Politics and Culture. 
Thériault, B. (2009). "Inquiring into Diversity. The Case of Berlin Police Inspector Bobkowski." 
German Politics and Society 27(4): 72-91. 
Todd, A. (2015). "Religion, security, riths, the individual and rates of excahnge: Relgion in 
negotiation with British public policy in prisons and the military " Religion, State and Society. 
Torrekens, C. (2015). Islam in Belgium: from Formal Recognition to Public Contestation. After 
Integration. Islam, Conviviality and Contentious Politics in Europe. M. Burchardt and I. 
Michalowski. Wiesbaden / New York, Springer VS. 
Werkner, I.-J. (2004). Der ostdeutsche Weg der evangelischen Soldatenseelsorge – eine Retrospektive. 
Strausberg, SOWI Arbeitspapier 138. 
Yee, J. (2005). For God and Country. Faith and Patriotism under Fire. New York, Public Affairs. 
 
 
  
Author contacts: 
 
Ines Michalowski 
WZB Berlin Social Science Center 
Reichpietschufer 50 
D - 10785 Berlin 
Email: ines.michalowski@wzb.eu 
 
 
